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IS ASSENT STILL A PREREQUISITE FOR CONTRACT
FORMATION IN TODAY'S E-CONOMY?
Melissa Robertson
Abstract: A browse-wrap agreement is an online contract that governs the use of a Web
site but does not require users of the site to affirmatively agree to the terms and conditions of
the contract. The terms of a browse-wrap agreement are accessible to the user only by
clicking on an Internet link, often inconspicuously located at the bottom of a Web page,
marked "Terms and Conditions." Browse-wrap agreements purport to bind users to these
terms and conditions when the user merely performs a function of the Web site, such as
submitting a query on the site's database or downloading software. Despite the prevalent use
of browse-wrap agreements, courts are just beginning to consider their enforceability. To date,
four federal district courts have addressed the issue. Each court has approached the issue of
contract formation differently and has reached a different result. Courts should refuse to
enforce browse-wrap agreements. Users do not always have adequate notice that using a Web
site binds them to the terms and conditions of a browse-wrap. Even if the Web site does
provide notice to users that such terms and conditions exist, users are not given the
opportunity to adequately manifest their assent to such terms. Although courts must be
flexible as contracts evolve to accommodate electronic commerce, browse-wrap agreements
stray too far from the basic contractual principles of notice and assent. Accordingly, courts
should not enforce them.
Imagine you are browsing the Internet from your home computer.'
You are searching for the latest version of a popular software program
that allows you to download and play music from the Internet. You find
the software and proceed to download it. Soon after, you learn that the
software has infected your computer with a virus that has virtually
destroyed your computer's hard drive. You sue the software company for
damages. The company moves to stay the proceedings and compel
arbitration in Florida pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in the
terms and conditions of its Web site. You do not remember clicking on
an icon that says "I Agree" or otherwise forming a contract on the Web
site. In fact, you never even saw a list of terms and conditions on the
Web site. You learn that the terms and conditions of the site are hidden
behind a link at the bottom of the Web site, far below the icon which
allowed you to download the software. Next to this otherwise unmarked
link, there is a small statement that says, "By using this Web site you
agree to be bound by our Terms and Conditions." But you never assented
to arbitration in Florida. Surely a court of law would never bind you to
the terms and conditions of a Web site when you did not even know the
terms existed-would it? It just might.
1. Hypothetical created by the author.
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Courts should enforce online contracts only where the consumer has
adequate notice of the terms and conditions, the user affirmatively
assents to be bound by such terms, and the terms being invoked are
conscionable. Since the advent of the Internet, parties have been
contracting online.2 Because the validity of online contracts is unsettled,
many online businesses require users to affirmatively agree to express
contracts called "click-wrap" agreements to govern the use of their Web
sites? However, many other businesses rely on online contracts called
"browse-wrap" agreements4 that purport to bind users even though they
do not require users of the site to perform an affirmative act, or even
know about the contract.' Web sites with browse-wrap agreements
usually display a notice on the site that states that using the Web site
binds users to the terms and conditions of the site.' This announcement is
usually followed by a link to the site's full text of terms and conditions,
which may or may not be on the same Web page as the notice. Despite
the prevalent use of browse-wrap agreements, courts have just recently
begun to consider the enforceability of such contracts
The law regarding the enforceability of browse-wrap agreements is
unsettled.' To date, four federal district courts have addressed the
enforceability of browse-wrap agreements.' ° Prior to 2000, no court had
2. See Kirk R. Ruthenberg, On-line Contracting, Click Through Transactions and Electronic
Signatures-Is Your Contract Worth the Paper it Isn 't Written On?, 1, at
http://www.sonnenschein.com/website/website.nsf (last visited Dec. 17, 2002).
3. See Mark H. Wildasin, Shrink Wrap, Click Wrap, and Now Browse Wrap: Did You Just Make a
Contract?, METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, Oct. 2001, at 13. Click-wrap agreements are
online contracts that contain a Web site's terms and conditions. A user must click an icon that states
"I Agree" or a similar phrase of agreement to indicate assent to the terms and conditions of the site.
4. Browse-wrap agreements are also called "web-wrap" or "browse-through" agreements.
5. See Wildasin, supra note 3, at 13.
6. See id.
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(refusing to enforce arbitration clause within defendant's browse-wrap agreement because plaintiffs
did not adequately manifest their assent to the agreement); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F.
Supp. 2d 238, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting preliminary injunction against defendant after finding
that defendant manifested assent to plaintiffs browse-wrap agreement); Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd.,
170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 982 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss after finding that
plaintiff's browse-wrap agreement "may be" valid and enforceable); Ticketmaster Corp. v.
Tickets.Com, Inc., No. CV99-7654-HLH (BQRx), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987, at *18 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 10, 2000), aff'd, 248 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2001) (denying plaintiff's motion for preliminary
injunction after finding that plaintiff did not provide sufficient proof of defendant's agreement to
plaintiffs browse-wrap agreement).
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addressed the issue." Initially, courts did not definitively hold whether
terms within browse-wrap agreements were enforceable.12 One court
noted that users of a Web site with a browse-wrap agreement may or
may not understand that they are bound by the terms and conditions of
the site merely by visiting it. 3 However, that court refused to declare the
browse-wrap agreement unenforceable. 4 The apparent enforceability of
analogous contracts prevalent in the software industry, such as shrink-
wrap 5 and click-wrap 6 licenses, 7 suggested that courts would enforce
terms within browse-wrap agreements as long as they were not
unconscionable. 8 In Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 9 a federal district
court confirmed this assumption by enforcing a term within a browse-
wrap agreement. 20 However, a recent federal district court opinion,
Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.,2 places the enforceability of
browse-wrap agreements into question.22 In Specht, the court held
browse-wrap agreements to be unenforceable because they do not require
users to affirmatively assent to the terms and conditions; and without
assent, no valid contract exists.23
This Comment argues that courts should not enforce browse-wrap
agreements. Rather, courts should enforce online contracts only where
users have adequate notice of the terms and conditions and affirmatively
agree to be bound by such terms. Accordingly, assuming that the terms
11. See Pollstar, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 981.
12. See, e.g., id. at 982; Ticketmaster Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987, at *18.
13. See Pollstar, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 981.
14. Id. at 982.
15. A shrink-wrap agreement is an unsigned license agreement commonly used in the software
industry. Shrink-wrap agreements generally come inside a software product's packaging or are
displayed on a user's computer screen when the user installs the software on his or her computer. See
infra Part II.A.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. In the context of software contracts, the terms "license," "contract," and "agreement" are often
used interchangeably. See, e.g., JANE K. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE, § 6.02[A], at 6-3-6-7 (4th ed. 2001).
18. See WINN, supra note 17, § 6.01, at 6-2. ("[Ilt seems likely that courts will uphold clickwrap
and webwrap contracts based on the Internet display of a standardized form contract by a vendor and
some act on the part of the accepting party indicating acceptance of the offered terms. It will be more
difficult to predict whether each provision of such a standard form contract will be enforced,
however.").
19. 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
20. See id. at 248.
21. 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
22. See id. at 596; see also Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting
in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 489 (2002).
23. See Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
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invoked are conscionable, courts should enforce click-wrap agreements
because they provide users with adequate notice and require them to
affirmatively assent to the terms. Part I of this Comment establishes
contract law principles that are relevant to determining whether browse-
wrap agreements are enforceable. Part II examines the enforceability of
analogous contracts such as shrink-wrap and click-wrap agreements, as
well as online contracts under the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act.24 Part I of this Comment analyzes the four federal
district court cases that have addressed the enforceability of browse-wrap
agreements. Part IV argues that courts should not enforce browse-wrap
agreements because they do not provide users with adequate notice of the
terms and conditions of the agreement or require users to adequately
manifest assent. Further, Part IV argues that courts should enforce click-
wrap agreements because they do provide users with adequate notice and
require users to manifest assent. This Comment concludes that click-
wrap agreements strike an essential balance between facilitating online
business and ensuring that users are not bound by contracts of which they
had no knowledge.
I. CONTRACT LAW PRINCIPLES RELEVANT TO THE
ENFORCEABILITY OF ONLINE CONTRACTS
A contract, in its simplest terms, is the binding promise of one party to
another.25 Contract law generally requires three elements to create a
binding contract: offer, acceptance, and consideration.26 The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts defines a contract as "a promise or a set of
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."27 At
24. Unif. Computer Info. Transactions Act, available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ucita01.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2002) [hereinafter
U.C.I.T.A.). Several scholars contend that courts should not enforce shrink-wrap agreements
because they are unfair to consumers. This argument is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a
general discussion of policy reasons against enforcement of shrink-wrap agreements, see Jane M.
Rolling, The UCC Under Wraps: Exposing the Need for More Notice to Consumers of Computer
Software with Shrinkwrapped Licenses, 104 COM. L.J. 197 (1999). Scholars also contend that courts
should not enforce click-wrap agreements for similar reasons. For a discussion of policy reasons
against enforcement of click-wrap agreements, see Roger E. Schechter, The Unfairness of Click-on
Software Licenses, 46 WAYNE L. REv. 1735 (2000).
25. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.1, at 3 (3d ed. 1999).
26. Zachary M. Harrison, Note, Just Click Here: Article 2B's Failure to Guarantee Adequate
Manifestation of Assent in Click-Wrap Contracts, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
907, 914 (1998).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979).
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common law, a contract was formed when one party accepted another
party's offer.28 The Restatement provides that "the manifestation of
mutual assent to an exchange ordinarily takes the form of an offer or
proposal by one party followed by an acceptance by the other party or
parties.,,29 The offeree's acceptance, which may take the form of a return
promise or act, creates a binding contract."
Contract law has evolved over the years to accommodate modem
business practices.3' For example, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) loosens the requirements of contract formation such that a
contract may be formed "in any manner sufficient to show agreement.
32
However, the terms of a contract will not be enforced if a court finds
them to be unconscionable, regardless of the manner in which the
contract was formed.33 For example, courts will generally enforce
standardized form contracts because parties have a duty to read the
contract before agreeing to its terms,34 but they will invalidate the terms
of the contract if they are unconscionable.35
Because the UCC substantially loosens the requirements necessary to
form a valid contract, parties may manifest their assent electronically.36
UCC § 2-204 provides that a contract may be made "in any manner
sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which
recognizes the existence of such a contract., 37 Further, UCC § 2-206
provides, "an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting
acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the
circumstances., 38 Courts have subsequently interpreted UCC §§ 2-204
and 2-206 to allow parties to create enforceable contracts over the
Internet.39 However, there are many issues regarding the enforceability of
online contracts. For example, what conduct is required by the parties to
manifest their assent to online contracts? How do procedural and
substantive unconscionability affect the enforceability of terms within
28. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 3.3, at 113.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 22(1).
30. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 3.3, at 113.
31. See Wildasin, supra note 3, at 13.
32. Id.
33. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2000).
34. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 4.26, at 297.
35. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,448-49 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
36. See WINN, supra note 17, § 6.02, at 6-3.
37. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (2000).
38. Id. § 2-206(1)(a).
39. See GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF THE INTERNET § 10.07 (2d ed.
2002).
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online contracts? And how does the enforceability of standardized form
contracts and the duty to read apply to online contracts? This Comment
will now discuss how the issues of assent, unconscionability, the
enforceability of standardized form contracts and the duty to read relate
to the enforceability of online contracts.
A. Assent
To create an enforceable contract, a party must assent to its terms. 40
However, it is not entirely clear what conduct is sufficient to adequately
manifest a user's assent to the terms and conditions posted on a Web site.
Several courts have expressed concern over a user's ability to adequately
manifest assent to online contracts.4' According to E. Allan Farnsworth,
"[s]ince it is difficult for a workable system of contract law to take
account of assent unless there has been an overt expression of it, courts
have required that assent to the formation of a contract be manifested in
some way, by words or other conduct, if it is to be effective."4 Courts,
however, are just now determining what conduct is required from a user
to create an enforceable online contract.43 Must a user click on an icon
that says "I Agree?" Or is it enough that a user downloads software or
submits a query on a Web site that contains a notice that says "By using
this site you agree to be bound by our terms and conditions?" Must the
user actually read the terms and conditions of the site? And does the user
even have to see the link to the terms and conditions? These questions
remain largely unanswered.
Whether a court finds that a user manifested assent to an online
contract may depend largely on whether the court applies a subjective or
objective theory of assent. Under the subjective theory, a court examines
the actual intentions of the parties and requires, as often stated, a
"meeting of the minds."44 If a party did not specifically intend to assent
to a particular term, then that term is not enforceable.45 However, under
the objective theory of assent, a court looks only to "the external or
objective appearance of the parties' intentions as manifested by their
40. FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 3.1, at 110.
41. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 596 (S.D.N.Y.
2001); see also Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
42. FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 3.1, at 110.
43. See Hillman, supra note 22, at 488-89.
44. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 3.6, at 16-17.
45. See id.
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actions."46 Therefore, even if a party did not intend to assent to a
particular term, a court will enforce it if a reasonable person would
conclude that the party intended to assent by their words or conduct.4 7
Although the subjective theory of assent is reflected in the Restatement
of Contracts,48 the objective theory is most commonly employed by the
courts.49 Generally speaking, there is no contract without assent, but once
the objective manifestations of assent are present, the author is bound.
There are many unanswered questions regarding assent and the
enforceability of online contracts.
B. Unconscionability
Because online contracts are unilaterally imposed on the user, these
contracts may include terms that are materially unfavorable or unfair to
the user.50 Depending on the circumstances, a court may find such terms
to be unconscionable."' The equitable doctrine of unconscionability was
codified in UCC § 2-302.52 It provides that if a court finds a contract
clause to be unconscionable, the court can refuse to enforce the contract
entirely, refuse to enforce only the unconscionable clause, or limit the
application of the clause so as to avoid an unconscionable result."
Courts generally recognize two kinds of unconscionability:
"procedural" and "substantive." 4 Procedural unconscionability relates to
how a term becomes part of a contract.55 For example, procedural
unconscionability may involve inconspicuous or unintelligible print, a
lack of opportunity to review the terms, or an inability to ask questions
regarding the terms and meanings of specific clauses.5 6 Procedural
unconscionability may also involve a unilaterally imposed standardized
form contract by a party with far greater bargaining power.5 7 However,
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §§ 210,212,215 cmt. b (1979).
49. FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 3.6, at 117.
50. See Hillman, supra note 22, at 468.
51. See Hillman, supra note 22, at 490.
52. See UCC § 2-302 (2000).
53. See id.
54. For an often cited, often praised, and often criticized discussion of substantive and procedural
unconscionability, see generally Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
55. See JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS 694 (7th ed. 1998).
56. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 4.28, at 311-12.
57. Id.
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while disparity in bargaining power or a standardized form contract alone
will not render terms within the contract unconscionable, these factors
may be significant when considered together with the substantive clauses
of the contract."
Substantive unconscionability refers to contracts or terms that are
oppressive or overly harsh." In determining whether a contract is
substantively unconscionable, courts have looked at several factors.60
These include provisions that deprive one party of the benefits he or she
is entitled to receive under the contract and provisions that bear no
reasonable relation to the business risk involved.6' Further, courts have
considered whether there is an unreasonable disparity in the cost and the
selling price and whether the contract creates an unreasonable advantage
for one party without producing an adequate benefit to the disadvantaged
party.62 Although the presence of one of these factors does not
necessarily mean that a court will invalidate the contract as
unconscionable, courts will generally invalidate the contract if both
procedural and substantive unconscionability exist.63
C. Standardized Form Contracts and the Duty to Read
Although contracts scholars have argued that standardized form
contracts are procedurally unconscionable, courts routinely enforce such
contracts because parties have a common law duty to read.6'
Standardized form contracts are regularly upheld by courts even if one
party did not read or understand the terms of the contract.65 Courts will
generally enforce such contracts even if the terms of the contract are
preprinted by one party and presented to the other party on a "take it or
leave it" basis.6 Courts have viewed online contracts as a novel type of
standardized form contract.67
58. Seeid. at312.
59. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9.40, at 373 (4th ed.
1998); see also DAWSON, supra note 55, at 694.
60. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 4.28, at 311.
61. See id.
62. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 59, § 9.40, at 373.
63. Id.
64. See id. § 9.42, at 377.
65. See id.
66. See id.; see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594-95 (1991) (holding a
forum selection clause printed on the back of a cruise ship ticket reasonable and enforceable because
such terms reduce litigation costs, insurance costs, and passenger fairs, despite the fact enforcement
of the clause effectively denied plaintiffs day in court). For a discussion of the enforceability of
forum selection clauses within online contracts, see Kaustuv M. Das, Comment, Forum-Selection
Vol. 78:265, 2003
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The enforceability of form contracts is typically justified by the
common law rule that a party has a duty to read a contract.68 Failing to
read the terms of a contract does not excuse a party from being legally
obligated to fulfill the contract.69 The exception to this rule arises when
the disputed terms are not sufficiently called to the attention of the
adhering party.7" Determining whether the terms were sufficiently called
to the attention of the adhering party depends on whether a reasonable
person under the circumstances would understand that the disputed terms
were part of the binding contract.7'
Although courts will generally enforce terms within standardized form
contracts, they have made exceptions to the rule in limited circumstances
where the terms of the contract were unfair under the circumstances.72
Courts can invalidate such contracts in whole or in part.73 Three grounds
exist for courts to invalidate terms within a standardized contract: (1) the
adhering party did not truly assent to a particular term; (2) the term
contravenes public policy and is therefore void; and (3) the term is
unconscionable.74
In Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,75 the federal Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit considered the enforceability of a
standardized form contract and concluded that, because the adhering
party likely did not know of the grossly unfair terms within the
preprinted form contract, the trial court erred in failing to determine
whether the doctrine of unconscionability was applicable. 76 The court
explained that when a party of little bargaining power signs an
unconscionable contract without having any knowledge of its terms, the
party has not truly assented to be bound by such terms. 77 Under such
circumstances, the court stated, the traditional duty to read rule should be
Clauses in Consumer Clickwrap and Browsewrap Agreements and the "Reasonably
Communicated" Test, 77 WASH. L. REV. 481 (2002).
67. WIN'N, supra note 17, § 6.02, at 6-3.
68. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 59, § 9.41, at 377.
69. See id.
70. See id. § 9.42, at 378.
71. See id.
72. See id. § 9.41, at 377.
73. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 4.26, at 309.
74. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 59, § 9.43, at 382-83.
75. 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (remanding to trial court to determine whether the doctrine
of unconscionability applied where a clause in an installment sales agreement resulted in
repossession of all items purchased from the store when the purchaser fell behind on payment of one
item).
76. See id.
77. See id.
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abandoned to avoid an unconscionable result.78 Additionally, a court may
find a term buried in a form contract to be unenforceable if a reasonable
person who has carefully read the contract could not be expected to
understand the term.79 The odds of unenforceability are greater if the
problematic term is in an inconspicuous place, such as the back of a
paper form or in fine print."
If a court finds that a party drafting a contract has included terms that
are egregiously one-sided, the court may construe the term in the manner
most favorable to the adhering party and most unfavorable to the drafting
party, without actually invalidating the term.8' Courts may also follow
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211(3), which suggests
invalidating a specific term of the contract when "the other party has
reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so
if he knew that the writing contained a particular term ....8 2
Although standardized form contracts raise a number of issues
regarding assent and fairness, their efficiency and convenience have
made them a significant and inescapable aspect of modem life.3 Many
scholars have argued that a party never truly assents to all the terms
within standardized form contracts. 4 Most notably, Karl Llewellyn, a
principal drafter of the UCC, argued that a party may give a "blanket
assent" to reasonable terms within a standardized form contract, but that
the party cannot truly assent to anything but the few dickered terms of
the contract.85 Llewellyn concluded that as long as the terms contained in
a standardized form contract are not unfair in presentation or substance,
courts should enforce them if the parties gave a blanket assent to be
bound by such terms.86
Another contracts scholar, Todd D. Rakoff, has argued that because
parties do not truly assent to standardized form terms, proponents of such
forms can not argue that standardized form contracts must be enforced to
78. See id. at 450.
79. WINN, supra note 17, § 6.02[A], at 6-3.
80. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 4.26, at 298.
81. Seeid. § 7.11,at473.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1979).
83. See Hillman, supra note 22, at 435-36.
84. See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J.
704 (1931); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1174 (1983).
85. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370 (1960).
86. See Hillman, supra note 22, at 455.
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uphold the principle of "freedom of contract.""7 He contended that
"[o]nce it is recognized that contracts of adhesion arise from the matrix
of organizational hierarchy, the argument for enforcement of form terms
as a recognition of 'freedom of contract' in its usual sense is
unsupportable."88 Regardless, courts have the tools to keep the drafters of
standardized form contracts in check.
I1. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF SHRINK-WRAP AND CLICK-
WRAP AGREEMENTS
When presented with the question of whether terms within browse-
wrap agreements are enforceable, courts have found an absence of
authority directly on point. Searching for a useful analogy, courts have
looked to cases addressing the enforceability of shrink-wrap and click-
wrap agreements for guidance. 9 Courts generally enforce terms in both
shrink-wrap 90 and click-wrap agreements.9 ' The Uniform Computer
Information Transaction Act (UCITA), a model law intending to provide
guidance on the enforceability of electronic contracts, provides that
shrink-wrap and click-wrap agreements are enforceable as long as the
user has a reasonable opportunity to review the terms and manifests his
or her assent in a manner sufficient to show agreement.92
A. Shrink- Wrap Agreements
A shrink-wrap agreement is an unsigned license agreement commonly
used in the software industry.93 Shrink-wrap agreements generally come
in two forms. The first includes the terms and conditions of a product
inside the sealed plastic of the software's packaging; hence the name,
"shrink-wrap agreement."94 The second displays the terms and conditions
on a user's computer screen when the user installs the software
program.9 Both types contain a notice to the user that using the product
87. Rakoff, supra note 84, at 1237.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 594-95 (S.D.N.Y.
2001); see also Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
90. See Wildasin, supra note 3, at 13.
91. See WmNN, supra note 17, § 6.02[A], at 6-7-6-8.
92. See DELTA, supra note 39, § 10.07, at 10-64.1-10-64.2.
93. See Wildasin, supra note 3, at 13.
94. See id.
95. See id.
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or keeping the product beyond a certain time period binds the user to the
terms and conditions of the product.96
In the early 1990s, courts considering the enforceability of shrink-
wrap agreements declined to enforce them on the grounds that they
constituted "additional terms" not part of the original contract.97 Under
UCC § 2-207, such additional terms required express consent beyond
merely opening the package and retaining the product for longer than a
specified time.98 Accordingly, a user merely opening a package or
viewing terms when starting up a software program did not constitute
express assent to the terms of the shrink-wrap.99 Without assent, no valid
contract existed.
However, a new trend emerged in enforcing shrink-wrap agreements
in 1996 with the seminal case ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.0 ° In ProCD,
the Seventh Circuit held that shrink-wrap agreements are enforceable
unless their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in
general, such as if they violate a rule of positive law or are
unconscionable."0 ' The shrink-wrap agreement at issue in ProCD came
inside the product's packaging with a notice on the outside of the
package requiring the user to review all terms and conditions within the
agreement.' °2 The notice further stated that if the buyer did not wish to be
bound by the terms, the buyer may return the product for a full refund. If
the buyer did not return the product, the buyer presumably agreed to be
bound by the terms of the shrink-wrap agreement.' 3 In holding such
terms to be enforceable, the ProCD court applied UCC § 2-204, which
allows a contract for the sale of goods to be made in any manner
sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties.'" The
Seventh Circuit concluded that opening a package and retaining the
product constituted acts sufficient to demonstrate assent.' 5 Since the
ProCD decision, many courts, both federal and state, have relied on the
96. See id.
97. See WINN, supra note 17, § 6.02[A], at 6-5.
98. See Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91, 97 (3d Cir. 1991). For
further discussion of UCC § 2-207 as applied to shrink-wrap licenses, see William H. Danne, Jr.,
Annotation, What are Additional Terms Materially Altering Contract within the Meaning of UCC
§ 2-207(2)(b), 72 A.L.R.3D 479, § 6 (Supp. 2002).
99. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc., 939 F.2d at 99.
100. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
101. Id. at 1449.
102. Id. at 1450.
103. See id. at 1452-53.
104. See id. at 1452.
105. See id. at 1452-53.
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Seventh Circuit's reasoning in ProCD to enforce similar shrink-wrap
agreements.
0 6
B. Click- Wrap Agreements
Courts have relied on the same line of reasoning in ProCD to enforce
click-wrap agreements." 7 Click-wrap agreements, which acquired their
name from their similarity to shrink-wrap agreements, are electronic
contracts that contain a Web site's terms and conditions.0 8 To form a
click-wrap agreement, a user "clicks" on an icon that states "I Agree" or
a similar phrase of assent.'0 9 The user may then proceed with the desired
action on the Web site, such as downloading software or searching the
site's database."10
Although this area of law is not yet entirely settled, the few courts that
have addressed the validity of click-wrap agreements have found them to
be enforceable when the user had an opportunity to review the terms and
the terms were not unconscionable."' According to the UCC, a user may
agree to be bound by a contract in any manner sufficient to show
agreement, and courts have generally found that clicking on an icon that
says "I Agree" or a similar phrase of assent is sufficient to demonstrate
agreement to be bound by the terms. "2
106. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that,
because the plaintiffs retained a computer beyond the thirty day period specified on the computer's
box, they assented to the terms contained inside the box, including the arbitration clause at issue);
Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 140 Wash. 2d 568, 583-84, 998 P.2d 305, 313 (2000)
(holding that a limitation of liability in a license agreement contained in software packaging was
conscionable and enforceable even though it denied plaintiff from recovering consequential
damages); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding
that plaintiffs manifested their acceptance to the terms contained inside a computer's box when they
retained the computer beyond the specified thirty day period). But see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104
F. Supp. 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000) (denying defendant Gateway's motion to dismiss because the
court found that retaining a computer beyond the specified five day period was not sufficient to
demonstrate assent to defendant's arbitration clause, which was in defendant's shrink-wrap
agreement).
107. See Hillman, supra note 22, at 487-88.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See DELTA, supra note 39, § 10.05, at 10-57-10-58.
112. See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1260 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding the click-
wrap agreement between plaintiff, an Ohio-based Intemet service provider, and defendant, a
customer from Texas, to be a valid contract; therefore, defendant had sufficient minimum contacts
with Ohio for an Ohio district court to assert personal jurisdiction); In re RealNetworks, Inc.,
Privacy Litig., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6584, at *21 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000)
(rejecting an intervenor's arguments that an arbitration clause within a click-wrap agreement is
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C. The Enforceability of Online Contracts Under UCITA
Recognizing the lack of uniformity in the case law regarding
transactions in the computer industry, including the enforceability of
software licenses and online contracts, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) formed a committee
in March of 1994 to draft a new UCC Article 2B to govern these
transactions." 3 The committee met numerous times between 1994 and
1999, attempting to meet the divergent requests of both consumer groups
and copyright industries." 4 After failing to finalize a new Article 2B, the
NCCUSL created a model law, the UCITA in 1999.'5 According to one
commentator, "[t]he essence of UCITA . . .is that it is a commercial
contract law that provides a framework for forming software [and online]
contracts, much as the UCC provided the framework for contracts to
purchase and sell goods."'" 6 Although UCITA has only been adopted in a
few jurisdictions," 7 it is important to consider because courts may still
look to it for guidance." 8
UCITA contains provisions regarding the enforceability of electronic
contracts."' It champions a "freedom of contract" approach to electronic
contracting and generally favors the drafters of standardized form
contracts. 20 The Act reflects the same line of reasoning employed by the
Seventh Circuit in ProCD. UCITA maintains that shrink-wrap and click-
wrap agreements are generally enforceable, as long as the agreements
meet basic requirements regarding the user's opportunity to review the
terms and conditions and manifest their assent to be bound. 2' Although
UCITA does not specifically consider browse-wrap agreements, it lays
unenforceable); Hotmail Corp. v. Van Money Pie Inc., No. C98-20064 JW, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729,
at *16-17 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998) (granting a preliminary injunction ordering defendant users to
stop using plaintiff email provider's service for transmitting unsolicited email pursuant to a clause
prohibiting such acts in plaintiff's click-wrap agreement); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732
A.2d 528, 533 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (affirming trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims
pursuant to a forum selection clause in defendant's click-wrap agreement); Groff v. America Online,
Inc., No. PC 97-0331, 1998 RI. Super. LEXIS 46, at *16 (RI. Super. Ct. May 27, 1998) (dismissing
plaintiff's complaint pursuant to a choice of law clause in defendant's click-wrap agreement).
113. See Harrison, supra note 26, at 929.
114. See id.; see also WINN, supra note 17, § 6.01, at 6-2.
115. See WINN, supra note 17, § 6.01,at 6-2.
116. See DELTA, supra note 39, § 10.07, at 10-64.1.
117. See generally UCITA Online, What's Happening to UCITA in the States, at
http://www.ucitaonline.com/whathap.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
118. See WNN, supra note 17, § 6.01,at 6-2.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. DELTA, supra note 39, § 10.07, at 10-64.1-10-64.2.
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out basic requirements for the enforceability of online contracts. UCITA
explicitly contrasts its example of an enforceable online agreement with
an online contract "that places the terms and conditions of the agreement
behind jumplinks labeled 'terms and conditions' or 'legal' and is tucked
unobtrusively at the bottom of the [Web] page, where they are unlikely
to be noticed by any but the most cautious or dilatory user."'
UCITA requires that electronic contracts provide users with an
opportunity to review the terms and conditions of the contract.'
According to a comment to UCITA, "[a]n opportunity to review requires
that the record be made available in a manner that ought to call it to the
attention of a reasonable person and in a form that readily permits
review."'24 Winn and Wright contrast a format that meets this
requirement, e.g., clearly marked terms and conditions prominently
displayed on a Web site, with a Web interface that hides terms and
conditions behind hyperlinks at the bottom of a Web page that the user
must scroll down to see. 2 ' Many terms and conditions, such as warranty
disclaimers, must be displayed conspicuously.'26 However, the user does
not actually have to review the terms and conditions to create an
enforceable contract.'27 This rule is consistent with the duty to read
standardized form contracts.
UCITA also contains provisions intended to clarify what constitutes
manifestation of assent to online contracts. 28 With respect to the
enforceability of click-wrap agreements, UCITA established a bright-line
rule: 29 if a user must click on an icon that states "I Agree" two times to
122. WINN, supra note 17, § 6.02[A], at 6-8, n.28.
123. DELTA, supra note 39, § 10.07, at 10-64.2.
124. U.C.I.T.A. § 112, cited in WINN, supra note 17, § 6.02[A], at 6-8-6-9, n. 28.
125. WNN, supra note 17, § 6.02[A], at 6-8-6-9, n. 28.
126. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(14), reprinted in WINN, supra note 17, § 6.04[A], at 6-27-6-28, n.127:
Conspicuous terms include the following:
(A) with respect to a person:
(i) a heading in capitals in a size equal to or greater than, or in contrasting type, font, or color to,
the surrounding text;
(ii) language in the body of a record or display in larger or other contrasting type, font or color
or set off from the surrounding text by symbols or other marks that draw attention to the
language; and
(iii) a term prominently referenced in an electronic record or display which is readily accessible
or reviewable from the record or display ....
Id.
127. WNN, supra note 17, § 6.02[A], at 6-3.
128. See id. § 5.08[C], at 5-55.
129. A critic of this rule has argued that creating a bright-line rule for click-wraps is premature at
best and misleading at worst. See id.
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get through a contract formation interface, then the user has manifested
assent to the terms and conditions of the click-wrap. 30 For other software
contracts, UCITA established the rule that a user has manifested assent if
that person either: (1) "authenticates a record"; 3' or (2) intentionally
engages in conduct with reason to know that the other party will infer
assent from that conduct, provided that person has knowledge of the
contents of the record, or was given a reasonable opportunity to review
it.132 In sum, courts have enforced shrink-wrap and click-wrap
agreements and UCITA provides that these contracts should be enforced
as long as users have a reasonable opportunity to review the terms and
conditions of the contracts and manifest their assent in a manner
sufficient to show agreement.
III. FEDERAL COURTS HAVE REACHED CONFLICTING
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF
BROWSE-WRAP AGREEMENTS
Although four federal district courts addressing the enforceability of
browse-wrap agreements have turned to the Seventh Circuit's decision in
ProCD for guidance, they have not all reached the same conclusion. 33
Two courts reasoned that browse-wrap agreements should be enforced as
long as the user has demonstrated assent. 34 For example, a user could
indicate sufficient intent to be bound by downloading software from the
Web site, searching the Web site's database, or by accessing a site that
130. See id.; see also Groff v. America Online, No. PC 97-0331, 1998 R.I. Super. LEXIS 46, at *13
(R.I. Super. Ct. May 27, 1998) (applying this "two clicks" rule prior to the enactment of UCITA to
conclude that the plaintiff user had formed a valid contract and was therefore bound by defendant's
forum-selection clause).
131. Legislation such as the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) and the Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN) establish useful guidelines for
electronic record authentication. UETA Online, at http://www.yetaonline.com (last visited Oct. 22,
2002); Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat.
464 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7001-7233 (2002)). They establish that, with certain exceptions,
electronic signatures and electronic documents have the same legal force and effect as traditional
signatures and paper documents. They also provide broad definitions for electronic record
authentication, validating everything from a simple mouse click to complex encrypted digital
signatures. Neither act, however, gives guidance on the formation of electronic contracts. See UETA
Online, at http://www.uetaonline.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2002); Electronic Signatures in. Global
and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7001-
7233 (2000)).
132. UCITA § 112(a), reprinted in WINN, supra note 17, § 5.08[C], at 5-55 (emphasis added).
133. See Wildasin, supra note 3, at 13.
134. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 246-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also
Pollstar v. Gigmania, 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
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contained language such as "By using this site you agree to be bound by
the terms and conditions contained herein." '35 In contrast, the other two
courts concluded that the user must explicitly assent to the terms-not
merely use the site-to indicate assent.36 To better understand the
courts' reasoning, each decision will be discussed separately and in
chronological order.
A. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.: Refusing to Enforce a
Browse- Wrap Agreement
In Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., ' an unpublished opinion,
a federal district court in the Central District of California refused to
enforce the plaintiffs browse-wrap agreement because the defendant had
not assented to be bound by its terms and conditions.'38 The plaintiff,
Ticketmaster Corp., maintained a Web site where users could receive
information about upcoming events and purchase tickets online.'39
Defendant Tickets.com used automated software to extract information
from the plaintiffs Web site about upcoming concerts and ticket vendor
locations, change the data's font and format, and post the data on its own
Web site. 4 ' The primary source of information for the defendant's online
ticket clearing house was Ticketmaster's Web site. 4' Ticketmaster filed
suit alleging that the defendant's actions were a breach of contract
because, among other things, Ticketmaster's browse-wrap agreement
prohibited using any of the information obtained from its site for
commercial use.142
Ticketmaster's browse-wrap agreement consisted of a general
statement that use of the site bound users to its terms and conditions.'43
Next to this statement was a link to the full text of the Web site's terms
and conditions.'" Ticketmaster argued that the defendant should be
135. Registercom, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 248; Pollstar, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 981.
136. See Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
see also Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., No. CV99-7654-HLH (BQRx), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12987, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000), afid, 248 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2001).
137. No. CV99-7654-HLH (BQRx), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000), affd,
248 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2001).
138. Id. at *18.
139. Id. at *4-5.
140. Id. at *8-9.
141. See id.
142. See id. at *11.
143. Id. at *6.
144. Id.
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bound by the terms contained therein. 4 The court disagreed, stating that
Ticketmaster "lacks sufficient proof of agreement by defendant to be
taken seriously ....,146 However, the court did not provide further
explanation or analysis. The court noted its unfamiliarity with concepts
such as automated software.'47 The court also noted that a user on
plaintiffs Web site was not required to click an "I agree" icon before
using the site,'48 but it did not elaborate on the significance of such an
act. '49
B. Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd.: A Browse- Wrap Agreement May Be
Enforceable
Although the facts of Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd.'50 were similar to
those in Ticketmaster, the federal district court in the Eastern District of
California considering the case was hesitant to reach the same result.''
Plaintiff Pollstar alleged that defendant Gigmania breached its browse-
wrap agreement when Gigmania accessed Pollstar's Web site, copied
information, and posted it on its own Web site. 52 Pollstar's Web site
contained a notice stating that if users accessed any of the information on
the site, they agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions posted on
the site.'53 This notice, which was in small gray text on a light gray
background, provided a link to the full text of the Web site's terms and
conditions.' 54 However, the link was not underlined, which is a common
method of indicating an Internet link within a Web site's text.," Like
Ticketmaster's browse-wrap agreement, Pollstar's browse-wrap
145. See id. at *7-8.
146. Id. at *18.
147. Id. at *8 ("[Tickets.com] does not obtain the information in the same way as does the public
(that is, by opening up an interior Web page and reading the information off the screen), but rather
by a sophisticated computer method of monitoring the thousands of interior [Ticketmaster] Web
pages electronically by the use of a mysterious (to the court) device[] know[n] as [] 'webcrawlers' or
'spiders."').
148. Id. at *6.
149. The court provided a more detailed analysis of Ticketmaster's copyright claim, which the court
concluded was not valid because factual information may not be copyrighted. See id. at *9-10.
150. 170 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
151. Id. at 982.
152. Id. at 976.
153. Id. at 977.
154. Id. at 980-81.
155. Id. at 981.
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prohibited use of information obtained from the site for commercial
purposes."6
Gigmania moved for dismissal, arguing that the browse-wrap
agreement was unenforceable because users of Pollstar's Web site did
not have adequate notice of its terms and conditions. 7 The court denied
Gigmania's motion and stated that it found the reasoning of ProCD and
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc."8 persuasive.'59 In both ProCD and Hill,
courts enforced shrink-wrap agreements based on the proposition in
UCC § 2-204 that parties may form an enforceable contract in any
manner sufficient to show agreement. 60 Expressly reserving judgment on
the enforceability of browse-wrap agreements, the Gigmania court stated
that it hesitated to declare browse-wrap agreements unenforceable
because decisions within the Seventh Circuit, such as ProCD and Hill,
demonstrated that users can be bound by terms they did not see.
161
Although the court denied Gigmania's motion to dismiss and recognized
the potential validity of browse-wrap agreements, it expressed concern
that users of Pollstar's Web site may not be aware of the terms because
notice of the license agreement was in small gray text on a light gray
background and the link to the terms was not underlined. 62
C. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.: Enforcing a Term Within a
Browse- Wrap Agreement
In Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,163 a district court in the Southern
District of New York was first to declare that browse-wrap agreements
are enforceable as long as users receive clear notice of the terms."
Plaintiff Register.com, a registrar of Internet domain names, sought an
injunction against defendant Verio, a competitor and Internet service
provider,6 ' for using automated software to access information on its
Web site about its customers and compiling the information for mass
156. Id. at 976 n.1.
157. Id. at 980-81.
158. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
159. Pollstar, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 981.
160. See supra notes 100-106 and accompanying text.
161. Pollstar, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 982.
162. Id. at 981.
163. 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
164. See id. at 248.
165. Id. at 241.
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marketing purposes, such as sending "spam.' ' 166 Register.com alleged
that this process constituted a breach of contract because its Web site
contained a browse-wrap agreement that prohibited commercial use of
any information obtained from its site. 167 Like the Web sites at issue in
Ticketmaster and Pollstar, Register.com's Web site stated that using the
site demonstrated assent to be bound by the terms and conditions of the
agreement. 1
68
Register.com argued that the defendant had formed a contract when it
submitted a query on Register.com's database. 69 The defendant
dismissed this argument by maintaining that merely submitting a query
did not adequately indicate assent to the terms; an independent act
demonstrating agreement to be bound by the terms of the browse-wrap
was required. 7 ° The court agreed with Register.com that the "terms of
use are clearly posted on [the] Web site. The conclusion of the terms
paragraph states, 'By submitting this query, you agree to abide by these
terms."""' Therefore, the court concluded, "there can be no question that
by proceeding to submit a ... query, Verio manifested its assent to be
bound by Register.com's terms of use, and a contract was formed and
subsequently breached.'
' 72
D. Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.: Refusing to Enforce an
Arbitration Clause in a Browse- Wrap Agreement
In Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.,173 a different federal
district court in the Southern District of New York refused to enforce an
arbitration clause within a browse-wrap agreement. 7 The plaintiffs,
several individual consumers, filed a claim against defendants, Netscape
and its parent company, America Online. 7 1 The consumers alleged that
the defendants' SmartDownload software transmitted private information
about their Internet activity to the defendants in violation of the
Electronic Communications and Privacy Act and the Computer Fraud
166. See id. at 244. "Spain" refers to unsolicited emails, the online equivalent to junk mail. For a
discussion of span, see WiNN, supra note 17, § 2.06, at 2-37-2-40.
167. See Register.corn, 126 F. Supp. at 245-48.
168. Id. at 248.
169. Id. at 245-46.
170. Id. at 248.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
174. See id. at 596.
175. Id. at 587 n.2, 587-88.
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and Abuse Act.'76 Pursuant to the arbitration clause in the browse-wrap
agreement, the defendants sought to stay the proceedings and compel
arbitration.'77 The court held that the plaintiffs were not bound by the
terms of the browse-wrap agreement because they never affirmatively
assented to its terms. 1
78
The software at issue in Specht was available on the defendants' Web
site, where users like the plaintiffs could download it for free by clicking
on an icon that said, "Download."' 79 At the bottom of the Web page was
the statement "Please review and agree to the terms of the Netscape
SmartDownload software license agreement before downloading and
using the software."' 80 This statement could only be seen by scrolling
down the Web page past the "Download" icon.'18 The statement
contained an underlined hyperlink to the defendants' full text of terms
and conditions. 182 The full text contained a notice in all capital letters
stating that, if users did not agree to be bound by the terms, they must not
download the software. 1
83
Distinguishing the enforceability of click-wrap agreements from the
defendants' browse-wrap agreement, the court stated that the defendants'
terms would have been enforceable merely by requiring users to click an
"I Assent" icon or something similar before they may download the
software.'" Unlike browse-wraps, the court noted, click-wraps require
users to click their assent to the terms before they may proceed with an
activity on a Web site.'85 The court rejected the defendants' argument
that clicking "Download" indicated assent in the same way that clicking
"I Assent" does.'86 The court explained that downloading is "hardly an
unambiguous indication of assent.' ' 87 Rather, the purpose of
downloading is to obtain a product. 188 However, "clicking on an icon
stating 'I assent' has no meaning or purpose other than to indicate such
176. Id. at 587.
177. Seeid. at 598.
178. Id. at 596.
179. Id. at 588.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 595.
185. Id. at 596.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 595.
188. Id.
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assent."'189 The court concluded that "Netscape's failure to require users
of SmartDownload to indicate assent to its license as a precondition to
downloading and using its software is fatal to its argument that a contract
has been formed."' 90
The Specht court was also troubled that users were not required to link
to the page displaying the full text of terms and conditions before
proceeding with the download. 9' Citing ProCD,'92 the defendants argued
that users who downloaded their software were bound by their terms
regardless of whether they actually read them; just as those who buy
products containing shrink-wrap agreements are bound by the terms of
the shrink-wrap agreements regardless of whether they actually read
them.'93 The court rejected this argument, distinguishing defendants'
terms from terms within shrink-wraps, because "shrink-wrap
agreement[s] ... require users to perform an affirmative action
unambiguously expressing assent before they may use the software."' 94
Accordingly, the court held that users are not bound by electronic
contracts unless they affirmatively indicate their assent.'95
IV. COURTS SHOULD ONLY ENFORCE ONLINE CONTRACTS
THAT PROVIDE USERS WITH ADEQUATE NOTICE AND
REQUIRE AFFIRMATIVE ASSENT
Considering the countless number of Web sites that are purportedly
governed by browse-wrap agreements, 96 courts must come to a
consensus regarding their enforceability. Courts should not enforce
browse-wrap agreements because they do not satisfy the requirements
necessary to create a valid contract, such as notice and assent. Online
contracts should only be enforced where users have adequate notice of
the terms and conditions of the contract and affirmatively agree to be
bound by such terms. Accordingly, courts should enforce click-wrap
agreements, assuming that the terms invoked are conscionable, because
they provide users with adequate notice and require them to affirmatively
assent to their terms.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 596.
192. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
193. See Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 595-96, 596 n. 14.
194. Id. at 595.
195. Id.
196. See Wildasin, supra note 3, at 13.
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A. A Uniform Consensus Regarding the Enforceability of Browse-
Wrap Agreements is Needed
The four courts to date that have addressed the enforceability of
browse-wrap agreements have not provided consistent guidance on the
issue, much less established a cohesive body of law. Both Ticketmaster
and Pollstar fail to provide useful precedent on the enforceability of
browse-wrap agreements. Although the Specht court and the
Register.com court applied similar reasoning to determine whether the
parties were able to adequately manifest their assent, they reached
conflicting conclusions. Because browse-wrap agreements are used to
govern the use of countless Web sites, businesses as well as consumers
should know whether terms in such agreements are enforceable.
1. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com and Pollstar v. Gigmania Fail to
Provide Useful Precedent
Neither Ticketmaster nor Pollstar provide helpful precedent because
the Ticketmaster court does not supply explicit analysis and the Pollstar
court never reaches a definite conclusion regarding the enforceability of
browse-wrap agreements. The Ticketmaster court addressed whether the
browse-wrap agreement was a valid contract in one sentence: "The
contract theory lacks sufficient proof of agreement by defendant to be
taken seriously as a ground for preliminary injunction."' 97 The court
failed to explain its reasoning or provide any further guidance on the
issue."-8 The court's admitted unfamiliarity with concepts such as
automated software most likely contributed to its apparent issue-
dodging.' Additionally, the court may have been satisfied with its
conclusion based on copyright law that factual information may not be
copyrighted.2"' Therefore, even if the defendant was bound by
Ticketmaster's agreement, Ticketmaster still lacked a claim sufficient for
a preliminary injunction because defendant obtained and posted factual
information about upcoming concerts.2"' Regardless of the court's
reasons for skirting the browse-wrap enforceability issue, the single
197. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV99-7654-HLH(BQRx), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12987 at *18 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000), afftd, 248 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2001).
198. However, the court did state that it did not intend to make any significant legal
pronouncements. Id. at *4. Rather, the court stated, directives regarding areas of unsettled law such
as the enforceability of browse-wrap agreements should come from the courts of appeals. Id.
199. Id. at *8; see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
200. See Tickemaster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987, at *9-10.
201. Id. at *9.
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sentence that the court devotes to the issue does not establish useful
authority.
Although the Pollstar court analyzed the enforceability of browse-
wrap agreements more thoroughly than the Ticketmaster court, it reached
an equally unsatisfying conclusion.0 2 The Pollstar court merely stated
that a browse-wrap agreement "may" be enforceable.2 3 The Pollstar
court's conclusion is most likely explained by the procedural posture of
the case. Defendant Gigmania had moved for dismissal and the court was
reluctant to dispose of Pollstar's claims on an issue about which it was
uncertain.2 4 Although the court expressly stated its concern that users
may not have adequate notice of a browse-wrap agreement, the court did
not make any pronouncements regarding their enforceability generally.
The court explained its denial of defendant's motion for dismissal by
suggesting that plaintiffs browse-wrap may be enforceable without
actually deciding whether browse-wrap agreements are enforceable.2 5
Accordingly, Pollstar, like Ticketmaster, fails to provide useful
authority.
2. The Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp. and Register.com,
Inc. v. Verio, Inc. Courts Employ Similar Reasoning but Reach
Conflicting Conclusions
Although both Specht and Register.com were decided by federal
district courts in the Southern District of New York, the courts reached
opposite conclusions. The courts' significantly different decisions are
most likely explained by the cases' different facts. In Register.com, the
term at issue prohibited users like the defendant from using information
obtained from the Web site for the purposes of sending spam.2 °6 This
type of term is not inherently troubling. In fact, such a term is most likely
appreciated by Register.com's customers. In contrast, the term at issue in
Specht was a mandatory arbitration clause.207 Courts are generally more
cautious about enforcing clauses that waive adhering parties' legal right
to sue.2 8 Although such waivers are valid if executed appropriately,
courts are reluctant to enforce them if it is questionable whether the
202. See Pollstar v. Gigmania, 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981-82 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Register.com Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
207. Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp. 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
208. See DAWSON, supra note 55, at 186.
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adhering party agreed to be bound by such a clause. °9 The term at issue
in Register.com protected the public while the term at issue in Specht
deprived the public of a legal right. This difference may explain the
different outcomes by two federal district courts within the same district.
Further, the parties in Specht and Register.corn were not equally
sympathetic. In Specht, the parties arguing against enforcement were
individual consumers filing suit against a major corporation that was
trying to deny them their day in court.21 In Register.com, the defendant
was an online business that was allegedly surreptitiously obtaining e-
mail addresses of unwitting online consumers from the database of an
unwilling competitor for the purpose of clogging the consumers' inboxes
with spain.21'" Thus, although neither court noted these factual differences
as the reason for its decision, these differences likely played an implicit
role in the courts' analysis.
Both the Specht court and the Register.com court based their holdings
on the adequacy of the parties' manifestation of assent. 2 The Specht
court justified its contrary conclusion by distinguishing the facts of
Register.com.2 3  But this attempted distinction is tenuous. The
Register.corn court found that clicking on the "Submit Query" button
was an adequate indication of assent, whereas the Specht court found that
clicking on the "Download" button was not an adequate indication of
assent."" It should not matter that the buttons used different language,
nor should it matter that the Specht court applied California law while the
Register. corn court applied New York law. Both opinions rest on whether
a contract was formed between the parties and both states require mutual
assent to form an enforceable contract." 5 Arguably, Register.com's Web
site contained clearer notice to its users that submitting a query bound
them to the Web site's terms and conditions.2"6 Yet it is doubtful that the
Specht court would have enforced Netscape's arbitration clause if its
Web site had contained the same language as Register.com's Web site
209. See id.
210. Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 587.
211. Register.com, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 241.
212. See Ryan J. Casamiquela, Business Law: Contractual Assent and Enforceability in
Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 475, 484-85 (2002).
213. Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 594 n.13.
214. See Casamiquela, supra note 212, at 484-85.
215. See id.
216. Register.com's website stated that using the site bound the user to the terms and conditions of
the site. See Register.corn, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 242-43. By contrast, Netscape's notice asked the user
to "please review" the terms and conditions. See Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 588.
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because the Specht court demanded explicit affirmative assent.21 7 Merely
submitting a query as the defendant did in Register.com does not meet
this demand.2t8 In sum, these four federal district court opinions-one of
which is unpublished-do not provide useful guidance regarding the
enforceability of browse-wrap agreements because they have
distinguishable facts that arguably explain their conflicting conclusions.
B. Courts Should Not Enforce Browse- Wrap Agreements
Courts should refuse to enforce browse-wrap agreements because they
do not satisfy the requirements necessary to create a valid contract." 9
Browse-wrap agreements do not necessarily give users adequate notice
that merely using a Web site binds them to the terms and conditions of
that site.22 Further, even if the Web site provides notice that such terms
and conditions exist, users are not given the opportunity to adequately
manifest their assent.22' The ProCD court and other courts' conclusion
that shrink-wrap and click-wrap agreements are generally enforceable is
not applicable to browse-wrap agreements because browse-wrap
agreements do not require users to affirmatively assent. Further, the
manifestation of assent purportedly acceptable to create a browse-wrap
agreement does not satisfy the standards for adequate manifestation of
assent promulgated by UCITA. Finally, declaring browse-wrap
agreements unenforceable will benefit online businesses by encouraging
them to use other, more enforceable online contracts.
1. Browse- Wrap Agreements Fail to Provide Users with Sufficient
Notice to Create an Enforceable Contract
Users often do not receive adequate notice that they are entering into a
binding contract when they perform an act purportedly sufficient to bind
them to a browse-wrap agreement. 22 The average consumer may not
even realize that such terms governing Web sites exist. 23 The notices
intended to alert consumers that using a Web site binds them to the terms
and conditions of the site are often located at the bottom of a Web page
217. Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 595.
218. See id.
219. See infra, Part II.
220. See Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 595.
221. See id.
222. See Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 594 (citing Pollstar v. Gigmania, 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980-82
(E.D. Cal. 2000)).
223. See Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 594.
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where a user has to scroll down to see them. The notice may also be
written in a color similar to the background color, like the Web site in
Pollstar.224 In Specht, Netscape's notice was problematic because its
statement asking the user to "please review" the terms of the software
license before downloading the software was too mild an invitation to
notify the user that a binding contract was being formed.225 A user may
perform an act that the notice claims will bind the user to the site without
actually ever seeing the notice, much less the text of the agreement's
actual terms and conditions.226 There is nothing about submitting a query
on a database or downloading free software that inherently alerts a user
that a binding contract is being formed. Absent clear notice, users have
no way of knowing that they are entering into a contract.227
Browse-wrap agreements do not provide users with adequate notice of
their terms and conditions, and therefore should not be enforced. The
common law requires that the terms of a contract be clear, unambiguous,
and plainly visible.22' Binding a party to a contract of which the party had
no knowledge contravenes traditional principles of contract law.229
Courts apply this principle to cases involving standardized form
contracts.230 As in traditional contract law, there is an exception to the
duty to read rule for terms that are not adequately called to the attention
of the user."3 Such terms are not enforceable.232 Because it is unlikely
that the terms and conditions of a browse-wrap agreement are adequately
called to the attention of the user, or "plainly visible" as required to
create an enforceable contract, the browse-wrap agreement should not be
enforced.
Further, browse-wrap agreements fail to meet even the standards
promulgated by UCITA regarding adequate notice of online terms and
conditions. UCITA requires that users be given an opportunity to review
the terms and conditions of an online contract before being bound.23
UCITA explicitly contrasts its example of an enforceable online
agreement with an online contract "that places the terms and conditions
224. Pollstar, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 981.
225. See Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 595-96.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 7.8, at 454-55; see also CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note
59, § 9.42, at 378-79.
229. See infra Part II.
230. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 59, § 9.42, at 378-79.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. U.C.I.T.A. § 112, reprinted in WINN, supra note 17, § 6.02[A], at 6-8, n. 27.
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of the agreement behind jumplinks labeled 'terms and conditions' or
'legal' and tucked unobtrusively at the bottom of the [web] page, where
they are unlikely to be noticed by any but the most cautious or dilatory
user."2 34 While UCITA does not mention browse-wrap agreements by
name,235 the example UCITA provides of an online contract that does not
give users adequate notice is indeed a browse-wrap agreement.
2. Browse- Wrap Agreements Do Not Require Users to Adequately
Manifest Their Assent
Even if a Web site provides adequate notice of its terms and
conditions, users can not adequately manifest their assent to a browse-
wrap agreement. It is possible to create a Web site that provides ample
notice to users that use of the site binds them to the terms and conditions
governing the site. It is also possible to create clear, explicit interfaces
that allow users to review the terms and conditions of an agreement.236
But adequate notice alone does not create an enforceable contract. Users
must also manifest their assent to be bound by a browse-wrap agreement.
Browse-wrap agreements are not enforceable because users are not
required to affirmatively indicate their assent.
An adhering party must manifest assent to the terms and conditions of
an agreement to create an enforceable contract. 7 Although there are
exceptions to this rule, they are generally not applicable to the creation of
an enforceable standardized form contract.238 Failing to manifest assent
to the terms and conditions of a standardized form contract could result
in the invalidation of its terms.239 The Specht court, applying this
principle to a browse-wrap agreement, stated:
The case law on software licensing has not eroded the importance
of assent in contract formation. Mutual assent is the bedrock of any
agreement to which the law will give force. Defendants' position
[that downloading software when a notice states that such an act
constitutes assent to the terms of the browse-wrap], if accepted,
234. WINN, supra note 17, § 6.02[A], at 6-8, n.28.
235. The term "browse-wrap" was not adopted until after UCITA was finalized by the NCCUSL in
1999. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp. 150 F. Supp. 2d 585. 594 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (E.D. Cal. 2000) (noting that the Pollstar court was the first court to use the term "browse-
wrap" when it used the term on Oct. 27, 2000).
236. For example, a large window with the entire text of the terms and conditions inside may
provide users with a reasonable opportunity to review the terms and conditions of the browse-wrap.
237. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 3.1, at 110.
238. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 59, § 9.43, at 382-83.
239. See id.
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would so expand the definition of assent as to render it
meaningless.24°
According to the Specht court, assent to a browse-wrap agreement must
be affirmative.241
Although a user may subjectively intend to manifest assent to the
terms and conditions of a browse-wrap agreement by downloading
software or submitting a query, it does not follow that such an action
objectively manifests assent. Users can not manifest assent to a browse-
wrap agreement because there is no way for them to affirmatively assent.
Click-wrap agreements, by contrast, require users to affirmatively
manifest assent. Courts should enforce conscionable terms and
conditions contained in click-wrap agreements. Such contracts meet the
contractual principles of notice and assent. Notice is inherently provided
by the window that displays the "I Accept" and "I Do Not Accept" icons
to the user. Click-wrap agreements require users to affirmatively indicate
their assent by clicking on an icon. While such an act does not guarantee
that users have read and understood all of the terms and conditions
contained in the contract, the act is analogous to a user signing a paper
standardized form contract.242 Courts should enforce terms within click-
wrap agreements because, like signing a paper contract, the user is
notified that they are entering into a binding agreement and must indicate
their assent before a contract is formed.
Users do not have an opportunity to manifest assent to browse-wrap
agreements in the same way that they may manifest assent to shrink-
wrap and click-wrap agreements. Although the ProCD court's reasoning
is arguably applicable to click-wrap agreements, it is not equally
applicable to browse-wrap agreements. Users' ability to assent to terms
of shrink-wrap agreements is central to ProCD's holding that such
contracts are enforceable.243 Similarly, users' ability to assent to click-
wrap agreements is central to courts holding that such contracts are
enforceable. 2" Users are not given the same opportunity to assent to
browse-wrap agreements.245 The court in Specht v. Netscape explained
that "downloading is hardly an unambiguous indication of assent. The
240. Specht v. Netscape Communication Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
241. See id.
242. The issue of whether such an act must be authenticated to ensure that an unauthorized person is
not forming a contract on a user's computer is beyond the scope of this Comment.
243. ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
244. See, e.g., Groff v America Online, No. PC 97-0331, 1998 R.I. Super. LEXIS 46 (R.I. Super.
May 27, 1998) *12-13.
245. See Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 595.
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primary purpose of downloading is to obtain a product, not to assent to
an agreement., 246 Although a user may form a contract in any manner
sufficient to show agreement, performing a Web site function does not
objectively meet this requirement. Therefore, courts should not apply the
reasoning of the ProCD court to hold that browse-wrap agreements
enforceable because such contracts do not allow users to adequately
manifest their assent.
In addition to failing to meet traditional contract law requirements for
manifesting assent, browse-wrap agreements also fail to meet UCITA's
requirements for manifesting assent. For software contracts other than
click-wraps, UCITA provides that a user has manifested assent "if that
person either [1] authenticates a record or [2] intentionally engages in
conduct with reason to know that the other party will infer assent from
that conduct, provided that person has knowledge of the contents of the
record, or was given a reasonable opportunity to review it."247
Accordingly, a user may meet the first method of the UCITA test by
electronically signing an online contract or engaging in some kind of
intentional activity to manifest assent. A browse-wrap agreement does
not require or even allow users to sign it. If it did, it would no longer be a
browse-wrap agreement because it would involve affirmative assent.
In sum, under UCITA, a user must engage in intentional activity to
manifest assent to a browse-wrap agreement. However, even if a court
concludes that a user intentionally entered into a browse-wrap agreement
by downloading software, for example, and therefore satisfied the first
prong of the UCITA test, the user is still not bound unless he or she also
satisfies the second prong of the UCITA test by either knowing the terms
and conditions of the agreement or by having a reasonable opportunity to
review them. Further, browse-wrap agreements do not provide users with
a reasonable opportunity to review terms and conditions because a user
does not necessarily even know that the terms are there. Therefore, the
browse-wrap agreement should not be enforced under contract law
principles and UCITA's requirements for manifestation of assent.
246. Id.
247. U.C.I.T.A. § 112(a), (emphasis added), reprinted in WINN, supra note 17, § 5.08[C], at 5-55.
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3. Declaring Browse- Wrap Agreements Unenforceable Will
Encourage Online Businesses to Use Other, More Enforceable
Online Contracts and Protect Consumers
If courts refuse to enforce browse-wrap agreements, the result will
benefit online businesses as well as consumers. The current state of the
law gives online businesses with browse-wrap agreements a fifty-fifty
chance that their terms will be enforced. These odds are not high enough
to justify such a large number of online businesses relying on browse-
wrap agreements to uphold their terms and conditions. Online businesses
would benefit from a definitive standard regarding the enforceability of
such agreements.
Online businesses that currently employ browse-wrap agreements are
at risk that courts will refuse to enforce their terms and conditions.24
Even if courts generally enforced terms and conditions within browse-
wrap agreements, online businesses could still be at risk that certain
terms would be invalidated on the grounds of unconscionability. Courts
generally do not invalidate terms on such grounds unless they find both
procedural and substantive unconscionability.249 Because users may not
have had adequate notice of the terms of a browse-wrap, they could
make a strong argument that the browse-wrap was procedurally
unconscionable. Therefore, users would have a strong argument that a
term denying their right to sue that they were unaware of is substantively
unconscionable.2 0 Although businesses are always subject to a court
invalidating a term on the grounds of unconscionability, the odds of that
happening are much smaller if the parties had clear notice of the terms
and agreed to them.25'
If courts refuse to enforce browse-wrap agreements, it will encourage
online businesses to replace browse-wrap agreements with online
contracts that require users to adequately manifest their assent. By using
these contracts, online businesses will benefit because it will be more
likely that the terms and conditions of their agreements will be enforced.
It can be argued that courts' refusal to enforce browse-wrap
agreements could hurt online businesses. Studies show that the fewer
steps Web sites require users to complete in a transaction, the more
transactions that will be completed.252 While this may be true, it is also
248. See Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
249. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 4.28, at 312.
250. See, e.g., Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
251. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 4.28, at 312-13.
252. See Ruthenberg, supra note 2, at 14 n.6.
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true that online contracts formed without the user's clear assent could be
invalidated, thereby eliminating the protections afforded to online
businesses by such terms.253
Further, if courts refuse to enforce browse-wrap agreements,
consumers will be protected from being bound by online terms and
conditions of which they had no notice. Although it can be argued that
adhering parties never truly assent to the terms and conditions of
standardized form contracts, most standardized form contracts require
users to at least take some affirmative action that recognizes the
formation of a contract, such as signing a document. 54 While parties may
not explicitly assent to each term in a standardized form contract, they
are at least aware that they are entering into a binding agreement. Courts
should apply this same principle to online contracts.
VII. CONCLUSION
Enforcing the terms and conditions of a browse-wrap agreement
against a consumer offends traditional principles of contract law, as well
as modem principles that require parties to assent to standardized form
contracts. Under contract law and UCITA, courts must ensure that users
assent to online contracts. While, as Karl Llewellyn suggests, there may
not be "true assent" to standardized form contracts, consumers must still
assent to be bound; even if it is a "blanket assent" to the terms of a
standardized form contract. Browse-wrap agreements stray too far from
the basic contractual principles of notice and assent. Accordingly, they
must not be enforced.
253. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 4.28, at 312.
254. See CALAMARI, supra note 59, § 9.43, at 383.
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